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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
ticularly where a domiciliary is evading the jurisdiction of the
court. If it be felt that such service should be strictly limited,
this is done by the express terms of the statute which require
that a diligent search be made, with supporting affidavit. Also,
where the defendant receives actual notice, there doesn't seem
to be the same reason for requiring proof of a diligent search
as in the case of publication.
-Murray D. Syverud
PROCEDURE: THE STATUS OF THE ASSIGNEE FOR
COLLECTION UNDER REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST STATUTES
The "Field Code" of 1848 gave rise to an entirely revised
form of procedure intended to combine in one form of acton, the
civil action, pleading at both common law and equity The gen-
eral statutory form stating the rule for parties plaintiff to this
civil action as adopted by many states is: "Every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest .... "
Following this general statement there are exceptions which vary
in different states in phrasiology and contextual setting. How-
ever, the words with regard to the "real party in interest"
used in the statutes mean the same thing.! It is the purpose of
this comment to consider whether the assignee of a chose in ac-
tion assigned for the purpose of collection' is the real party in
interest within the meaning of R. C. M. 1935, Section 9067 or
similar statutes in other states.
In the leading case of State v. Merchants' Credit Service,"
the Montana court held that such an assignee for collection
only was not the real party in interest and therefore was not
entitled to sue in its own name. Although the court made some
point of the fact that the collection agreement was set out in
the assignment instead of being "a collateral agreement" as is
that a court of that state may be empowered to render a personaljudgment against him which is valid, even though he is not personally
served within the state."
'Brumback v. Oldham (1878) 1 Idaho 709; PoMEBOY, CODE REManI
(5th ed. 1929) §§4, 50, pp. 5, 6, 83.
'Id. §§51, 53, 63, pp. 83, 86, 97. See also fn. 9, ifra.
'This comment does not deal with assignments "for security" and as-
signments of negotiable instruments. The former involve a pre-exist-
ing interest in the assignee and the latter involve highly specialized
rules of the Law Merchant. This distinction was made in State v.
Merchants' Credit Service (1936) 104 Mont. 76, 66 P. (2d) 337; and
see 1 WIrLISTON ON CONTRACTS (1924) §406, p. 754.(1936) 104 Mont. 76, 66 P. (2d) 337.
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usually the case, the tenor of the decision was not to limit the
rule to the situation where the agreement is fully expressed in
the assignment; and in Streetbeck v. Benson, the court peremp-
torily dismissed the suit of an assignee for collection mainly
upon the authority of the Merchants' Credit Service case, cit-
ing it as standing for the proposition that an assignee for
collection is not the real party in interest. In Northern Mon-
tana Association of Credit Men v. Hauge,' the rule was limited
to a record showing that the agreement was entered into for
the purpose of escaping the effect of the Merchants' Credit
Service case.
An examination of the recent authorities reveals that while
what is stated as the "majority" rule holds that the assignee
for collection only is the real party in interest,' another view
has been taken in at least isolated cases that in this situation
the assignee is not the real party in interest.' The decisions
are not distinguishable upon the basis of essentially different
statutes.'
'(1938) 107 Mont. 110, 80 P. (2d) 861.
(1940)-Mont.- , 105 P. (2d) 1102.
'POMEROY, op. cit. Supra note 1, §70, p. 106; WILTIsTON, op. cit. supra
note 3, §440, p. 841; CLARK ON CODE PLEADING (1928) §23, p. 101 (part
reprinted in 34 YALE L. J. 264) ; 5 C. J. Assignmwnts, §94; 64 L. R. A.
581 (1904). See the cases collected therein.
'Burtnett v. Gwynne (1855) 2 Abb. Prac. 79 (N. Y.). (New York
later adopted the "majority" view. Meeker v. Claghorn (1871)
44 N. Y. 349; Allen v. Brown (1870) 51 Barb. 86, 44 N. Y. 228). In
Kansas, Stewart v. Price (1902) 64 Kan. 191, 67 P. 553, 64 L. R. A.
581 was overruled by Manley v. Park (1904) 68 Kan. 400, 75 P. 557,
66 L. B. A. 967, 1 Ann. Cas. 832. North Carolina, Nebraska, and
Ohio are the best authority for the "minority" position today al-
though the latter two are represented by but one decision in point.
Hoagland v. Van Etten (1888) 22 Neb. 681, 35 N. W. 869, Re-aff.
23 Neb. 462, 36 N. W. 755; Abrams v. Cureton (1876) 74 N. C. 523;
Ravenel v. Ingram (1902) 131 N. C. 549, 42 S. E. 967; (see also
Martin v. Mask (1912) 158 N. C. 436, 74 S. E. 343, 346, 41 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 641); Brown v. Ginn (1902) 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123.
See KERR's PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1919) §§584, 586, pp. 786, 791
and fn 41 infra.
'The court in the Merchants' Credit Service case seems to suggest
at p. 98 of 104 Mont., 341 of 66 P. (2d) that our statute differs mate-
rially from that of those code states in which the real party in interest
and "exception" clauses are separated into two sections. It would
seem that this separation should not alter the legal effect. Most codes
in which the clauses are in separate sections provide: "Every action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except
as provided in section - "; or "except as otherwise provided by law."
PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 1, §51, pp. 83, 84. The following section
or sections are thus as effectively incorporated as If physically in-
cluded. This combination of the sections originated with Ch. 416, N.
Y. SEss. LAws (1877) amending Ch. 448 CODE op Crvi Pnocznuu
(1877) Ch. 448, §449. CAHILL N. Y. CIvIL PRACTICE (1937) §210. Cali-
fornia adopted the change In amending its CODE or Crvm PRocEouaE,
§367 in CODE AMENDMENTS (1880) p. 63 and the form continued until
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The rule of construction is recognized by the leading
authorities that the intention of the code writers was to adopt
the equity theory of parties rather than the legal theory, and
to apply it to the one civil action in all cases, whatever be
the nature of the primary right to be protected or of the
remedy to be obtained."° The codes were not intended to
change substantive law but to give to one who at common law
or equity had a cause of action, the right to bring the action in
his own name. It is therefore suggested that if one had a cause
of action either in his own name or in the name of one merely
a nominal party either in courts of law or equity before the
codes, that party who then had the cause of action must be the
real party in interest under the combined code procedure."
The law of assignments of choses in action had a gradual
development in the law courts culminating in the Code.' Very
early in the English law, the rights and ownership of the as-
signee were recognized and sanctioned only in the Chancery
Courts and there only with regard to a limited type of chose
in action to which a property right was attributed." With a
relaxation of the maintenance rule and the use of the express
formal power of attorney, assignees obtained relief in the com-
mon law courts by bringing action in the name of the as-
signor. From about 1800" the American equity courts came
to recognize that the assignee was adequately protected at law
and from then on chose to deny the assignee an equitable
STATS. (1901) p. 126 in which it was again divided. In 1895 Montana
adopted the section in this form from California. REv. STAT. UTAH
(1933) §104-3-1 was adopted from R. C. M. 1935, §9067. REv. CoDE ARIZ.
(1928) §3727 also combines the two clauses although the specific excep-
tions differ somewhat. These four states have uniformly held the as-
signee for collection as real party in interest. Greig v. Riordan (1893)
99 Cal. 316, 33 P. 913; Hopins v. Contra Costa County (1895) 106 Cal.
566, 39 P. 933 (these in the period when California had the "Joined"
section and before Montana adopted it) ; Mosher v. Bellas (1928) 33
Ariz. 147, 264 P. 468; Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ry. (1893) 9 Utah
228, 33 P. 1042; Moss v. Taylor (1928) 73 Utah 277, 273 P. 515;
Perkes v. Utah Idaho Milk Co. (1934) 85 Utah 217, 39 P. (2d) 308;
Walcott v. Hulman (1898) 23 Misc. Rep. 459, 51 N. Y. S. 358; Fried-
man v. Schulman (1905) 46 Misc. Rep. 572, 92 N. Y. S. 801.
"PoMEaoY, op. cit. supra note 1, §50, p. 83.
uCLARK, op. cit. supra note 7, §22, pp. 97, 98; 4 AM. JUn., Assignments,
§28, p. 251.
"Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARv. L. R. 816 (1916);
WuLTusToN, op. cit. supra note 3, §405, p. 753, §408, p. 756; CLOAK
op. cit. supra note 7, §21, pp. 94-96.
"Prosser v. Edmonds (1835) 1 Younge & Coll. Ex. 481, 496, 160 Eng.
Rep. 196, 202.
"Russell v. Cornwall (1794) 2 Root (Conn.) 122; Booth v. Warner
(1797) rep. in 4 Day (Conn.) 6, 18 (1809).
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remedy, at least where the only relief sought was a money
claim.' A Connecticut case in 1818" said:
"It is a well settled principle of common law in Con-
necticut, that the property in a chose in action, may be
assigned; and the courts of law have long since recog-
nized the property in the assignee as fully as courts of
chancery.... The old form of bringing the suit on the
note, in the name of the obligee, is, indeed, continued; but
it is now mere form. .... "
And in 1831 a Maine decision held:
"The assignee is to be recognized as the owner, and
all acts of the assignor subsequent to the assignment, and
affecting the validity of the contract are fraudulent. He
has no more power over it, than a stranger... ."
It was a primary purpose of the code provisions for suits
by the real party in interest to make it clear that there is no
longer necessity for the assignee to sue in the assignor's name."
The cases before the Code in which the problem of assign-
ments of choses in action for collection arose are few in number.
In Napier, Rapelje & Bennett v. McLeod," two partners at-
tempted to give to a third partner an irrevokable power of at-
torney to collect the partnership debts. Although the intention
to convey the cause of action as a property right might have
been inferred,' the court treated the plaintiff as having a mere
agency not coupled with an interest and held that the transfer
did not render inoperative a release subsequently executed by
one of the other members of the firm to one of the debtors who
had notice of the execution of the power of attorney. An earlier
case involving partnership property was distinguished on
grounds that the recitals in the instrument proved the "whole
interest" to be in the assignee, "at least until the settlement
of the partnership concerns." In Weakley v. Hall,' an inter-
"Hayward v. Andrews (1882) 106 U. S. 672, 27 L. Ed. 271, 1 S. Ct. 544.
"Colbourn v. Rossiter (1818) 2 Conn. 503, 508.
"'Hackett v. Martin (1831) 8 Greenl. (Me.) 77, 78.
"CLARK, op. cit. 8upra note 7, §23, pp. 100-102.
"(1832) 9 Wend. 120 (N. Y.).
"Assig ment, 5 C. J. §61 says: (In general) "no particular mode or
form is necessary to effect a valid assignment, and any acts or words
are sufficient which show an intention of transfering or appropriating
the owner's interest . . . there must be a present transfer of the
assignor's right, a transfer so far complete as to deprive the as-
signor of his control over the subject of assignment."
=(1844) 13 Ohio 167, 42 Am. Dec. 194. The court said at p. 175 of 13
Ohio, p. 196 of 42 Am. Dec.: (The replication shows) "clearly there
was no absolute transfer of the entire interest in the chose to (the
assignee). The extent of his interest was to depend on circumstances,
4
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esting early case of collection assignment, the assignee's title
was considered an undivided interest (tenancy in common).
However, the assignee's interest was held unenforceable for
champerty. In Porter v. Davis,' an admission of the assignor
of a judgment that no consideration passed and a receipt given
by the assignee stating that the assignor was entitled to the
amount of recovery less expenses of suit were admitted in evi-
dence; and the court held that the assignment did not create
such an ownership in the judgment that the assignee could set
it off against a judgment recovered against him by the defend-
ant in the judgment assigned. The court said that the "owner
beneficially" was not in fact the assignee but the assignor. In
Langdon v. La-ngdon,' it was held that the assignee of a non-
negotiable note for collection was a mere agent under a power
which had been revoked by subsequent payment to the assignor,
although the payment was made with notice of the assignment.
These cases seem to justify the conclusion that the courts
before the Codes regarded the assignee for collection as pos-
sessing no property right in the cause of action, but regarded
him as a mere agent. The trend of cases after the procedural
Codes is definitely contrary ;' and if the authorities are right
that the adoption of the real party in interest statute involved
no change in substantive rights, there must be some explana-
tion other than the presence of these statutes. There has been
almost no attempt by the courts to explain why they hold the
assignee for collection the real party in interest other than
merely to say that he has a "legal title." It is suggested that
the explanation for this change of view lies in commercial usage
and its influence on the courts. Now that it was no longer
necessary for the non-collector assignee to use the name of the
assignor in bringing suits, the door was opened for recognition
as real party in interest of the assignee for collection only.
He apparently had the cause of action and the courts which
follow the "majority" rule say he has a "legal title." How-
ever, these words are insufficient to describe the different own-
limited by his allowances and liabilities, and his share of the claim.
(Assignor and assignee), therefore, were tenants in common in this
chose in action against (the debtor), as between themselves. Each
had a distinct interest, and there was, therefore, something which
(the assignor's) release could operate upon and discharge, notwith-
standing this assignment . .. "
2(1845) 2 How. Prac. 30 (N. Y.).
"( 1855 ) 4 Gray (70 Mass.) 186.
2See fn. 7. The "majority" view is taken in cases involving non-
negotiable choses in action by the following "code" states: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wis-
consin, Wyoming.
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erships and plowers which an assignee may be considered to
have.' Further differentiation is necessary and the inquiry
is one involving a subjective consideration of property rights.
The ultimate question of who is the real party in interest
will be resolved, whether the answer is "not sufficient owner-
ship" or "sufficient ownership," by what the courts will con-
sider a valuable property interest transferable by assignment.'
Then what is the substance of that property interest? If we
break down the concept of "property interest" in a chose in
OThe inaccuracy of this term is manifest on a reading of WnILsToN,
op. cit. supra note 3, §§446a, 447, pp. 854-860. Certain characteristics
imposed upon assignments by courts of equity have been, and should
be, retained in the courts of law although equity no longer gives a
remedy to the assignee in general The word, "legal" is insufficient
to describe the multitude of different ownerships and powers to which
the term has been indiscriminately applied. One of the difficulties
of describing the assignee as a legal title owner is manifest in this
situation of an assignment for collection, where the assignor is more
vitally interested in the outcome of the suit than the assignee. Further
differentiation is necessary to explain why some courts have con-
cluded he has full ownership for the purpose of suit, while others
have treated him as a mere agent. See also Cook, The Alenability
of Choses in Action-Reply to Willton, 30 HARv. L. Rrv., 449 (1917).
As a common denominator for the two divergent views, the words,
"property interest" seem to be the most nearly accurate description of
the res assigned which has the qualities of transferability and value
under the "majority" view but does not possess these qualities under
the "minority" view. In another sense the words are inaccurate.
Value of a right is generally expressed in terms of benefits running
directly from its exercise. Pf. JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SO-
ci=rr, (1935) fn. 86, p. 66. A collection agreement fee may vary
from a fixed percentage measured by the judgment or recovery out
of court to a gratuity, and the courts treat them alike. The "value"
to the collector arises not directly out of exercise of the right but
indirectly out of the collateral arrangement. The mere power to go
into court and sue would be a burden to the possessor in a strict
economic sense. But analogy may be taken to a special power of
appointment which is considered a valuable transferable property
right although the possessor clearly obtains benefits only collaterally.
OThe ultimate differentiation used here has rarely been expressed by
the courts. Perhaps the leading case for the "minority" view and
one of the most ambitious attempts to analyze the problem was Stew-
art v. Price (1902) 64 Kan. 191, 67 P. 553, 64 L. R. A. 581. Doster,
Ch. J. in the specially concurring opinion said: "It is legally impos-
sible for one to transfer to another the mere right to bring a law
suit,-that and nothing more-and that was all that was attempted
in this case." The majority decision was based in large part on an
interpretation of the words "real party in interest" as disassociated
from their context. This is clearly revealed in the specially con-
curring opinion of Pollock, J. citing a dictionary definition of the
words as controlling. There was a strong dissent by four judges
aud the case was peremptorily overruled In Manley v. Park (1904)
68 Kan. 400, 75 P. 557, 66 L. R. A. 967, 1 Ann. Cas. 832 and is not the
Kansas law today. Cf. State ex rel Coffey v. District Court (1925)
74 Mont. 355, 258, 240 P. 667 supra; Hammell v. Superior Court in
and for Los Angeles County (1932) 217 Cal. 5, 17 P. (2d) 101, 103.
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action into two major elements--namely, (1) a right to sue
and enforce a claim and the correlative duty of the debtor to
respond in damages, and (2) the economic value of a judgment
recoverable in suit-we may more fully analyze the content of a
legal cause of action to which normally would attach the privi-
lege of suing in one's own name. " If (1) is regarded as a
property separately transferable by assignment without (2),
then the court will regard it as sufficient property interest to
maintain suit in the assignee's name. The courts which say
the assignee has the "legal title" and is therefore privileged
to sue in his own name" regard the assignment of the mere
power to go into court and bring suit as a sufficient property
to make the assignee the real party in interest. Those courts
which say "the beneficial ownership is in another"" are simply
insisting that the conveyance of (1) alone is of no effect.apart
from (2)." If the court gives effect to the transfer of (1)
alone, the one having a share or even all of (2) has no standing
in court as he has simply bargained away his right to sue the
debtor. It may well be that his contract with the assignee has
invested him with a separate chose in action (or right to sue)
against his assignee for any breach of that contract, but that
does not mature until after the primary law suit."
In the final analysis the concept is molded by whether the
court considers the interest of all concerned to be better served
by treating the bare cause of action as a transferable property
right." Many courts have stated the interest in terms of
"Cf. language of State ex rel Coffey v. District Court, 8upra, note 26:
"While courts, text-writers, and legislators have not always dis-
tinguished sharply between the right to recover and the thing to be
recovered, there cannot be any question that the right to recover is
comprehended in the term 'chose In action'."
"Brennan v. Weissbaum (1926) 77 Cal. App. 120, 245 P. 1104; Chase v.
Dodge (1901) 111 Wisc. '70, 86 N. W. 548; Ballinger v. Vates (1914)
26 Colo. App. 116, 140 P. 931; Cottle v. Cole (1866) 20 Iowa; 6 C.
J. S., Assignments, §94.
"Stewart v. Price (1902) 64 Kan. 191, 67 P. 553, 64 L. R. A. 581.
" Cf Hoagland v. Van Etten (1888) 22 Neb. 681, 35 N. W. 869, Re-aff.
23 Neb. 462, 36 N. W. 755, where gratuitous assignments for col-
lection were differentiated from where a fee was to be taken out of
the proceeds of suit, the latter being placed in the same category
with an assignment for collateral security. The court asserted that
it was conceded the assignee was not the real party In Interest and
then peremptorily dismissed the question. The case did not inquire
Into the problem to any appreciable depth.
"Allen v. Brown (1870) 51 Barb. 86, 44 N. Y. 228, 231.
'Of. language in Chase v. Dodge (1901) 111 Wis. 70, 86 N. W. 548
holding that plaintiff was the real party in interest but recognizing
that the controlling consideration was the Interests of all concerned.
It was said that Inquiry as to whether the transaction was merely
colorable "might become material If the rights of creditors were in-
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defendant's position, feeling he is the only one to lose." These
courts do not refer to the creditor's interest, but assume that
the assignee is acting in the best interests of the assignor. The
"minority" courts do not make that assumption but in effect
take the position that "this plaintiff is not the beneficial
owner", apparently feeling that the defendant is not the only
one to lose but that the "beneficial owner" would be damaged
by the suit.
Also, certain common law doctrines have been considered
by the "minority" as preventing suit by an assignee for col-
lection. Today the rule that an interested witness has no
capacity to testify has been generally repudiated," but certain
early cases refused to give effect to the assignment for collec-
tion on this ground." The doctrine, "covenants run with the
land", influenced one later case." The doctrines of champerty
and maintenance have been largely abandoned except in the
law regulating legal practice." However, this has been one of
the largest single factors influencing assignments for collec-
tion."
volved or upon the right of interposing some defense or counterclaim
supposed to be cut off by the assignment."
"Sheridan v. New York (1876) 68 N. Y. 30; King v. Miller (1908)
53 Ore. 53, 97 P. 542; Brumback v. Oldham (1878) 1 Idaho 709. The
typical opinion is (Sheridan v. New York) : "A plaintiff Is the real
party in interest under the Code, if he has a valid transfer as against
the assignor, and holds the legal title to the demand. The defendant
has no legal interest to inquire further. A payment to, or recovery
by, an assignee occupying this position, is a protection to the defend-
ant against any claim that can be made by the assignor." But see
Abrams v. Cureton (1876) 74 N. C. 523 which held the assignee
merely an agent for collection. The reasoning was that the real party
in interest statute was enacted to let in all defenses that the debtor
had against the creditor and to save a resort to another action. The
court must have ignored its counterpart of R. C. M. 1935, §9068, i. e.
1 CONsor. STATS. (1919), §446, which allows all such defenses to be
raised.
"See 2 WIGMoRE ON EVIDENCE (3d Ed., 1940), §575, p. 674; 5 JONES
COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2d Ed. 1926), §2117, p. 3982. R. C. M.
1935, §10535 (3, 4) provide that both the assignee and the assignor
are incompetent witnesses within the limited scope of that section.
"Burtnett v. Gwynne (1855) 2 Abb. Prac. 79, (N. Y.) ; Of. Crawford v.
Brooke (1846) 4 Gill. 163, (Md.) under statute.
"Ravenel v. Ingram (1902) 131 N. C. 549, 42 S. E. 967. See WLLISTON,
op. cit. supra note 3, §406, p. 755.
"Haley v. Hollenback (1917) 53 Mont. 494, 499, 165 P. 459; 10 AM.
Jur., Champerty d Maintenance, §7, p. 554 et see., §15, p. 561; 14
C. J. S., Champerty d Maintenance, §§3, 5, pp. 358, 359.
"Ravenel v .Ingram (1902) 131 N. C. 549, 42 S. E. 967; Brown v. Ginn
(1902) 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123; Stewart v. Welch (1885) 41 Ohio
St. 483, 503; Norton v. Tuttle (1871) 60 Ill. Rep. 130; Weakley v. Hall
(1844) 13 Ohio 167, 42 Am. Dec. 194. Brown v. Ginn laid great empha-
sis on the statement that plaintiff's "apparently beneficial interest was
in reality a contingent interest." Did it mean contingent fee? Here an
8
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The justification for the "majority" rule is commercial
expediency. For by commercial practice and understanding,
a chose in action not represented by a negotiable instrument
has come to be regarded as freely transmissable and valuable in
a sense independent of the original debtor-creditor relation.
Such a development makes possible the entire separation of
the original creditor from the suit, allowing the chose in action
to be transmitted for collection to the residence of the debtor.
An individual small claim may not justify an action for its
collection but if many are assigned to one party, it may become
economically feasible to bring action to enforce them.
The Montana statutes do not require a different interpre-
tation of real party in interest with regard to collection
assignments than the "majority" rule. Statements of the Mon-
tana court in the Merchants' Credit Service case would indi-
cate the court may believe that the California, Arizona, 'and
Iowa statutes specifically allowed the assignee of a chose in
action (in general) to sue in his own name while Montana
statutes do not. Examination of our statutes reveals that by
our substantive law, choses in action are clearly assignable, and
that the procedural code recognizes the assignee (in general)
as the real party in interest.* However, the court decided upon
the basis of the decision of four states which do not have the
real party in interest statutes and Ohio and North Carolina
cases as well as the doubtful statements made by Mr. Kerr,"
attorney took the assignments and the court said if it was a "real
transfer" It was champertous.
"In substantive law, R. C. M. 1935, J§6804, 6805, 7394, 7395, 7414, 7415
define a chose in action, render it transferable by assignment and en-
forceable in the courts, and no limitation is placed on the transfer by
these sections. Winslow v. Dundom (1912) 46 Mont. 71, 82, 125 P.
136; Schaeffer v. Miller (1910) 41 Mont. 417, 420, 109 P. 970; Bar-
barich v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co. (1932) 92 Mont. 1, 12, 9 P.
(2d) 797. The assignment of a chose in action is clearly recognized
in the Code of Civil Procedure by R. C. M. 1935, §9068, and it would
seem clear that action by the assignee is contemplated, the section
setting out defenses which may be set up in an "action by the as-
signee." Haupt v. Burton (1898) 21 Mont. 572, 55 P. 110, 69 Am. St.
Rep. 698; Genzberger v. Adams (1922) 62 Mont. 430, 205 P. 658, held
an assignee (general) the real party in interest. The latter case said:
"It having been made apparent that plaintiff was vested with the
legal title, he was the real party in interest within the meaning of
the statute and could maintain the action" citing R. C. M. 1921,
§9067. See also POMSROY, op. cit. supra note 1 §64, p. 98.
40Aiabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Tennessee, and Texas decisions,
although sometimes cited in connection with this problem, are not
authority for the question as these states do not have the real party
in interest statute. See ALA. CODE (1923), §5699; CONN. GEN. STATS.
(1930), §5516; SMITH HURD ILL. STATS. (1936), Ch. 11O, §§145, 146
and note; REv. STAT. MAINE (1930), Ch. 96 and particularly §154;
CODE OF TENN. (1932), Part III, Title 1, Ch. 3, pp. 1908, 1909; 5
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that the concept of real party in interest did not include the
assignee for collection.
If the collection assignment is void because of illegality,
it, of course, would not make the assignee the real party in
interest. This illegality might arise by virtue of the nature
of the subject matter or the purpose of the contract." This
objection might well be raised by the debtor in a civil action
against him where the action is based on an assignment per-
mitting the lay practice of law." But State v. Merchants' Credit
Service was a disciplinary proceeding against a corporation for
contempt, and the issue was whether a corporation had prac-
ticed law in certain civil suits previously brought by it. It
would not seem to raise fairly the question whether a debtor
might object to the illegality of assignments. However, the
court went into the real party in interest question to aid in its
VERNON's TEXAS STAT. (1926), §1980 et 8ec. See the extended enu-
meration of real party in interest statutes in PoMESoy, op cit. supra
note 1, §51, fNi 1-5, pp. 83, 84. See fns. 33, 36, 38 supra for explana-
tion of North Carolina and Ohio cases.
aKERR, op. cit. supra note 8, §§584, 586, pp. 786, 791. After careful
examination of the cases cited by Mr. Kerr in support of the argu-
ments used in the Montana case, it cannot fairly be said that they
in any way support the position taken by Mr. Kerr.
'tWxLLsToN, op. cit. supra note 3, §417, pp. 776-779; 13 C. J., Con-
tracts, §353, p. 423. See the dissenting opinion of State v. Merchants'
Credit Service (1936) 104 Mont. 76, 117, 66 P. (2d) 337, 349 for inter-
pretation of R. 0. M. 1935, §8980. Space does not permit adequate
consideration of this section but it is submitted that it appears too
ambiguous in connection with the sections to which it relates to be
given much effect. If given any effect it should be construed in re-
lation to R. C. M. 1935, §8983 as being a prohibition against one not
an attorney buying a claim with the concurrent intention of bringing
an action thereon and acting in person as attorney. See also Perkes
v. Utah Idaho Milk Co. (1934) 85 Utah 217, 39 P. (2d) 308 interpret-
ing a similar statute.
"The courts have held proceedings a nullity where based upon lay
practice. Stevens v. Smith Lumber Co. (1929) 54 S. Dak. 170, 222
N. W. 665; Clifton v. Carson Naval Stores Co. (1924) 32 Ga. App. 51,
122 S. E. 639; Colton v. Oshrin (1934) 155 Misc. 383, 278 N. Y. S.
146; Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co. (1923) 73 Colo. 586, 216 P. 718.
An agreement to engage in such law practice is unenforceable in the
courts. Johnson v. Davidson (1921) 54 Cal. App. 251, 202 P. 159;
In re Lynch's Estate (1935) 154 Misc. 260, 276 N. Y. 939; Crawford
v. McConnoll (1935) 173 Okla. 520, 49 P. (2d) 551. Sheldon v.
Pruessner (1895) 52 Kan. 579, 35 P. 201, 22 L. R. A. 709 held an
assignment of a note for the purpose of evading payment of taxes
due the state, invalid at the suit of the assignee saying: "Whatever
tends to interfere with the beneficial operation of the statute is unlaw-
ful, as against the policy of the law. Whatever tends to obstruct
duty by defeating the letter or sprit of the law is also unlawful; and
the courts will not enforce any agreement or contract for the benefit
of one through whose direction or assistance the law is violated, or
public policy contravened. The law attempts to close the doors to
temptations by refusing such parties recognition in the courts."
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 2 [1941], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/5
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
determination that the corporation unlawfully practiced law.
The purpose of the inquiry was to find that when the defend-
ant in this contempt proceeding sued on such claims it sued
in a representative capacity." Why did the court need to
inquire into a procedural incident of civil actions in this quasi-
criminal contempt proceeding? Although the court did not
cite the section, it must have felt that R. C. M. 1935, Section
8988 allowed any party to an action to act as his own attorney
and that it must show that the defendant here, was not a proper
party plaintiff in those civil actions which it brought on as-
signed claims." Had the court construed R. C. M. 1935, Section
8988, allowing any party to appear "in person" or by attorney
as it construed R. C. M. 1935, Section 9629, allowing "any
person" except the process server to act as attorney in Justice
Court, the inquiry would not have been necessary. The court's
ultimate finding was that the defendant's acts constituted the
practice of law and that since it was a corporation, it was not
relieved by R. C. M. 1935, Section 9629. But construing R. C.
M. 1935, Section 8988 in the same way, a corporation has no
personality and could not prosecute "in person." The court's
construction of R. C. M. 1935, Section 5903, that the practice
of law was not one of the proper purposes for formation of a
corporation would support this construction also." If a broad
rule were required, the court could have relied on the common
law public policy against allowing laymen to practice law."
R. C. M. 1935, Section 9629 should be construed together with
R. C. M. 1935, Section 8944 (the statutory definition of the
practice of law). The interpretation of R. C. M. 1935, Section
9629 might then well be that "any person" acting as an at-
torney in Justice Court means a regularly licensed attorney-
"Merchants' Credit Service case at lines 12 and 24, p. 100, of 104 Mont.,
lines 1 and 18, p. 342 of 66 P. (2d).
"Compare the special concurring opinion at pages 104, 105 of 104 Mont.,
p. 344 of 66 P. (2d). Note that this opinion does not rely upon the pro-
cedural point and depends mainly upon R. C. M. 1935, §§8944 and 5903
to show that defendant improperly practiced law.
"Compare the opinion and authority cited at pp. 100-102 of 104 Mont.,
p. 342 of 66 P. (2d). It would seem that if a corporation may not prac-
tice law indirectly by employing an attorney and "splitting fees" with
him, it would not be able to do the same through any lay agent. People
v. People's Stockyards State Bank (1931) 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901;
73 A. L. R. 1331 note; 15 CALIF. L. REv. 243 (1926).41Compare the special concurring opinion at pp. 104-108 of 104 Mont.,
pp. 343-345 of 66 P. (2d) ; Childs v. Smeltzer (1934) 315 Pa. 9. 171 A.
883; Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n (1935) 55
R. I. 122, 179 A. 139, 100 A. L. R. 226. This policy is reflected in the
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION.
Canons 34, "Division of Fees" and 35, "Intermediaries" are directed
against the indirect practice by laymen by means of control over the
licensed attorney or active participation in his practice.
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at-law or the occasional friend or neighbor who acts for an-
other without charging a fee." Otherwise he would be guilty
under R. C. M. 1935, Section 8944 of practicing law."
'Compare McCargo v. State (Miss. 1887), 1 So. 161, where it was held:
"A retired attorney who conducts but one suit in court for a friend
or neighbor, without fee or reward, is not thereby brought into the
classification of a practicing lawyer .... ." In Freeling v. Tucker(1930) 49 Idaho 475, 289 P. 85, an attorney from another state was
held not to have violated a statute against the practice of law for
renderipg services twice in a probate court since the statute was
aimed at the business of practicing law. State v. Bryan (1887) 98
N. C. 644, 4 S. B. 522, held that the defendant in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding was not shown to be practicing since there was no evidence
that he charged anything for appearance in court on behalf of an-
other or that he held himself out as a practicing attorney. See also
Paul v. Stanley (1932) 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401, differentiating
gratuitous and compensated services on the basis of a statute penaliz-
ing the practice of law for doing "work of a legal nature for com-
pensation."
"Acts such as the defendant was shown to have done in the priicipal
case have been held to constitute the practice of law. Defendant
necessarily held itself out as being skilled in appearances in Justice
Court which involve a certain legal skill and knowledge. Its appear-
ances as attorney In the J. P. action were such acts as are usually
done by an attorney-at-law in his practice. Defendant also solicited
this legal business. See In re Phillips (1922) 64 Mont. 492, 210 P.
80; 41 YALE L. J. 84-90 (1931). Defendant prepared and filed the plead-
Ings in the Justice Court actions and those pleadings were the basis
for appeals taken to higher courts. These acts are such as are usually
done by, or under the supervision of, an attorney. The courts have
frequently held that the drawing of such pleadings, examining wit-
nesses, and preparing causes for trial constitute the practice of law.
Johnson v. Davidson (1921) 54 Cal. App. 251, 202 P. 159; People v.
People's Stockyards State Bank (1931) 344 Ill. 426, 176 N. E. 901;
Childs v. Smeltzer (1934) 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883; Land Title Abstract
& Trust Co. v. Dworken (1934) 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N. E. 650; Paul
v. Stanley (1932) 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401; Crawford v. Mc-
Connell (1935) 173 Okla. 520, 49 P. (2d) 551. In the last case the court
said: "The preparation for a money consideration of legal instruments
to be shaped from a mass of facts and conditions involving the applica-
tion of intricate principles of law which can only be applied by a mind
trained in existing laws in order to insure a specific result and to
guard against other undesirable results comes within the term 'prac-
tice of law'." In the Merchants' Credit Service case, the court at
p. 102 of 104 Mont., pp. 342, 343 of 66 P. (2d) relies strongly
upon the demanding of attorney's fees as constituting some-
thing "usually done by a licensed attorney in his practice."
It would seem that demanding and taking anay fee based in
part or entirely upon legal services rendered in court would consti-
tute performance of such acts as an attorney does in his profession.
Thus, taking an additional percentage, where recourse to the courts
is necessary and the collection agent acts as an attorney, would be
receiving an attorney's fee. This would be equally true where a
"flat rate" is charged which envisages the contingency of taking the
case into court and is so computed as in the long run to cover the
cost of this additional service. See In re Newman (1916) 172 App.
Div. 173, 158 N. Y. S. 375. The Montana court might have exercised
more of the wide discretion which it has for the purpose of defining
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Therefore, so much of the opinion as declared that an as-
signee for collection was not the real party in interest was not
pertinent to the action, framed by the pleadings, or necessary to
the determination eventually reached and might well be re-
garded as obiter dictum. However, in Streetbeck v. Benson,
supra, defendant debtor raised the defense that plaintiff was
an assignee for the purpose of collection only. The court found
plaintiff was not the real party in interest relying almost
wholly upon State v. Merchants' Credit Service, which it viewed
as establishing a public policy for the state against all assign-
ments for collection. It is submitted that the public policy
established by the Merchants' Credit Service case was against
the lay practice of law and that the Streetbeck case miscon-
strued the effect of the former ease.
In general, it would seem that whether the assignee for
collection is to be treated as possessing a full ownership for the
purpose of suit, as being an agent, trustee, or tenant in common
is immaterial, if it be recognized that he owns the cause of
action. This would seem to be true although the cause of ac-
tion be the limited right to sue and enforce a claim and the
duty of the defendant to respond in damages--that and that
alone . '
-Frederick Dugan.
and punishing the unauthorized practice of law. In re Unification
of the Montana Bar Ass'n (1939) 107 Mont. 559, 87 P. (2d) 172. In
Rhode Island Bar As'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n (1935) 55 R. I. 122,
179 A. 139, 100 A. L. R. 226, it was said that a criminal statute speci-
fying acts constituting the practice of law, does not define practice of
law for all purposes nor take the control and supervision over the mat-
ter from the Supreme Court. At least in construing R. C. M. 1935,
38944, it would not be necessary to imply the limitation, "in any court
of record" (there relating to appearances as attorney) as applicable to
the clauses relating to acts usually done by an attorney or to the
holding out as an attorney clause.
"
0 The tenancy-in-common view taken by Weakley v. Hall (1844) 13 Ohio
167, 42 Am. Dec. 194, has not been followed under the Code for good
reason, as its practical application by the courts would be more diffi-
cult and confusing than concepts of "legal title." It might require both
parties to appear as real parties In interest.
$'It is submitted that the more accurate definition of real party in
interest should be: "That party who has the cause of action, whether
it be the mere right to sue and require that the defendant respond in
damages, or whether it include also the right to the thing sought by
means of the action." Such definition would resolve the doubt which
arises in the minds of the court if too much emphasis is put on the
words, "real . . . interest" as separated from their context and usage
by the courts. The "real interest" for the purpose of the suit is own-
ership of the right to sue, whether It arises by transfer, operation of
law, or contract.
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